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Abstract
While cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) involving emerging
markets have been increasing in recent years, a high percentage collapse
before completion. This study investigates how the predictors of cross-border
M&A completion involving emerging markets depend upon the direction of
global expansion, i.e., investment inbound to a developing market or
outbound from a developing market. Analysis based on 15 years of data from
four emerging economies, Brazil, Russia, India, and China, from 1995 to 2010,
reveals fundamental differences in the predictors of inbound vs. outbound
M&A completion. Country-level factors reflecting differences in political, trade,
and legal environments strongly affect the completion for inbound M&As, but
have a much weaker influence on outbound M&As. By contrast, firm-level
factors such as past M&A experience have a significantly stronger effect on
completion for outbound than for inbound M&As. Most interestingly, two deal-
level factors (the percentage of stake sought by the acquirer and whether or not
the deal is a cash transaction) increase the likelihood of completion for inbound
but decrease it for outbound M&As. These findings have important managerial
implications for enhancing the success of global expansions.
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INTRODUCTION
While rapid economic growth has made emerging markets major
battlefields for global expansion from developed economies, a
growing number of firms from emerging markets are also going
overseas. In the last decade, global expansion by emerging
economies has almost caught up to the speed of developed
economies entering emerging markets. For example, according to
the Thomson Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and
Acquisitions Database, global expansions by firms in emerging
economies (e.g., Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC)) have
increased by 8% in the last decade, a growth rate that approaches
that of expansions by firms in developed economies in the same
period. Some well-known expansions by firms in emerging
economies include the acquisition of IBM’s personal computer
business in 2005 by Lenovo (China); the acquisition of Volvo in
2010 by Geely (China); the purchase of Jaguar and Land Rover in
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2008 by Tata (India); and the purchase of the UK’s
Axon Group in 2008 by HCL (India).
This new globalization trend has stimulated a
growing number of studies investigating cross-
border M&As involving emerging markets (e.g.,
Luo and Tung, 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc,
2008; Aybar and Ficici, 2009; Lin, Peng, Yang, &
Sun, 2009; Gubbi, Aulakh, Sarkar, & Chittoor,
2010; Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2011; Li and Qian,
2013; Lebedev, Peng, Xie, & Stevens, 2015). These
investigations have advanced our understanding of
the various essential M&A strategic issues related to
emerging markets, such as M&A motivations,
country/firm selections, and post-M&A integration
performance. Researchers have not, however, paid
much attention to a critical issue in the process of
M&As: the failure to complete an announced M&A
deal. Academic attention to this issue is particularly
vital because, in practice, a significant percentage of
announced M&As involving emerging markets
have failed to complete. For example, in our sample
of 3,483 cross-border M&As involving BRIC, 32.5 %
of the announced deals failed to conclude. This
incompletion rate is much higher than the 18%
failure rate of announced cross-border M&As
between developed countries (Dikova, Sahib, &
van Witteloostuijn, 2010), the 18.7% failure rate of
domestic M&As in the UK (O’Sullivan and Wong,
1998a), and the 24.9% failure rate of domestic
M&As in the US (Cotter, Shivdasani, & Zenner,
1997).
Withdrawing an announced M&A deal can be
very costly to acquirers, entailing substantial costs
(e.g., penalties) that can be as high as over 6% of
the purchase value (Rosenkranz & Weitzel, 2005).
In addition to the costs involved in the M&A pre-
completion stage (e.g., payments to lawyers and
M&A agents as well as resources and time invested)
and substantial penalties due to contract breaks,
substantial proprietary costs could also be incurred
(Luo, 2005). For instance, competitors may fig-
ure out a firm’s strategic move and long-term
deployment based on an M&A’s announcement
information. Furthermore, the termination of an
M&A deal can ruin an acquirer’s reputation and
credibility (Luo, 2005). Withdrawing an announced
M&A deal between a developed and an emerging
country can be even more expensive because the
significant differences in legal, political, cultural,
economic, and trade environments between devel-
oped and emerging economies require even more
organizational resources in the pre-completion
stage.
While the failure of M&A completion has been
recognized as an important research topic by
scholars in finance, accounting, and strategy, most
studies have focused on domestic M&As. Specifi-
cally, this literature has investigated various firm-
level and deal-level factors that potentially impact
domestic M&A completion, including manage-
ment resistance (e.g., O’Sullivan & Wong,
1998a, b), board composition (Brickley, Coles, &
Terry, 1994; Cotter, Shivdasani, & Zenner, 1997;
Raad & Ryan, 1995), managerial ownership (e.g.,
Baron, 1983; Mikkelson & Partch, 1989; Stulz,
1988), bid premium (e.g., Walkling, 1985; Holl &
Kyriazis, 1996), stake sought (e.g., Walkling, 1985;
Sudarsanam, 1995; Holl and Kyriazis, 1996) and
payment method (e.g., Franks et al., 1988; Sudarsa-
nam, 1995). Although several recent studies have
extended the research on completion to cross-
border M&As, they focus either on deals between
developed countries (Dikova et al., 2010) or use a
general sample of cross-border deals without con-
sidering the specific characteristics of emerging
markets (Aguilera & Dencker, 2008; Muehlfeld,
Sahib, & van Witteloostuijn, 2007, 2012).
Different from these extant studies, this article
investigates M&A completion with a focus on a
special class of M&As, i.e., those wherein the
acquiring firm and the target firm are from two
significantly different economies, one from a devel-
oped country and the other from an emerging
country. Compared with domestic or cross-border
M&As between developed countries, M&As involv-
ing both developed and emerging countries face
potentially unfamiliar and uncertain environments
that increase the chance for acquirers to misunder-
stand or overlook some important information and
fail to recognize such mistakes before announce-
ments are made. It is also more likely for acquirers
to encounter unanticipated changes at the post-
announcement stage (e.g., unusual regulatory poli-
cies by the host country’s government). If acquirers
discover severe mistakes or run into major unfa-
vorable changes before deals are formally closed,
they may have no choice but to abandon the
announced deal in order to avoid more severe
losses in the future, even at the cost of substantial
organizational resources.
The objective of this research is to identify factors
that significantly impact the failure rate of M&As
involving both developed and emerging markets.
We contend that compared with M&As more
generally, substantial differences exist in M&As
involving two extensively different countries.
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Those differences stem from unfamiliarity that
investing firms experience when going from one
to the other institutional context, heightened
uncertainty that investing firms must deal with in
completing such deals, and the detrimental effects
of both unfamiliarity and uncertainty on comple-
tion likelihood. These factors suggest that effective
cross-border learning should play a particularly
important role in the successful completion of
M&As involving both developed and emerging
markets. However, acquirers from and to emerging
markets may face different challenges in cross-
border learning both at external and internal levels.
We develop a conceptual framework to capture
such differences.
We first classify a cross-border M&A involving
both developed and emerging countries into one of
two classes based on its deal direction: (a) an
Inbound M&A, in which a firm from a developed
economy acquires a firm in an emerging economy
(i.e., global expansions to emerging markets); and
(b) an Outbound M&A, in which a firm from an
emerging economy acquires a firm in a developed
economy (i.e., global expansions from emerging
markets). Then, we conceptualize key differences in
cross-border learning challenges between inbound
and outboundM&As in two dimensions: (a) External
Learning Barriers, and (b) Internal Learning Barriers.
Specifically, emerging countries often lack well-
established, transparent, and stable ‘‘rules of the
game’’ (e.g., legislation and regulations for doing
business) compared with developed countries, sug-
gesting higher external learning barriers for
inbound than for outbound M&As. Compared with
those from developed countries, acquirers from
emerging countries are relative newcomers in
global expansion, suggesting higher internal learn-
ing barriers for outbound than for inbound M&As.
Given these systematic differences, the influential
factors predicting the completion failure are likely
to be different for inbound M&As with high
external- but low internal-barriers and outbound
M&As with low external- but high internal-barriers.
Third, we identify such factors at three levels:
country-, firm-, and deal-level, some of which
strongly affect internal (external) barriers, but not
both; others affect both barriers, but in opposite
directions. This discussion leads to our hypotheses
regarding the moderating effect of M&A direction.
We test our hypotheses using a sample of 3,483
cross-border M&As related to the four emerging
economies (BRIC) and 23 developed economies
from 1995 to 2010. Among them, 2,736 are
inbound and 747 are outbound M&As. Our empir-
ical results provide support for our proposed
hypotheses and reveal some fundamental differ-
ences between inbound and outbound M&As.
First, we find that, in general, the larger the
country distance, i.e., the greater difference in law,
regulation, and risk level, between the developed
and emerging countries, the higher is the M&A
completion failure rate. However, such an effect is
more damaging for inbound M&As than for out-
bound M&As. Second, while acquirers’ past suc-
cessful M&A experiences help to enhance
completion of both inbound and outbound
M&As, this positive effect is stronger for acquirers
from emerging markets than acquirers to emerging
markets. Third, acquirers’ past failed M&A experi-
ences are generally detrimental rather than benefi-
cial for both types of M&As, but this negative effect
is more harmful to the completion rate for acquir-
ers from emerging markets than for acquirers to
emerging markets. Fourth, and most interestingly,
we find that two deal-level financial variables, stake
sought (i.e., the percentage of the ownership stake
in the target firm) and cash payment (i.e., the M&A
transaction processed by cash rather than stocks)
increase the completion of inbound M&As, but
decrease the completion of outbound M&As.
This research makes several contributions. First,
our research brings attention to a real-world busi-
ness problem that causes severe damage to firms
but has been unaddressed by academics: that is, a
significantly high percentage of cross-border M&As
involving emerging markets collapse before com-
pletion. Past studies have examined a number of
strategic issues important to the front end of the
M&A process related to emerging market firms
(EMFs), such as EMFs’ motivations in cross-border
M&As (e.g., Luo & Tung, 2007); EMFs’ selection of
global expansion strategies, i.e., exploitation vs.
exploration (e.g., Rabbiosi, Elia, & Bertoni, 2012);
and advantages in cross-border M&As by emerging-
market acquirers (e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc,
2008; Kumar, 2009). Past research has also identi-
fied various factors important to the post-comple-
tion stage, such as corporate governance structures
(e.g., Chari, Ouimet, & Tesar, 2010), institutional
environment (e.g., Li & Qian, 2013), cultural
distance (Malhotra, Sivakumar, & Zhu, 2011), and
organizational networks (e.g., Lin et al., 2009). Our
article contributes to this stream of research by
investigating an important issue arising in the
middle stage of the M&A process: failure to com-
plete deals that have already been announced. We
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conceptualize the fundamental differences between
the two types of M&As in two dimensions of cross-
border learning barriers, external and internal.
Accordingly, we identify influential factors that
determine the failure rate of M&As with a special
attention to the possible moderating effect of the
M&A direction, i.e., to vs. from emerging markets.
Our empirical findings on the most influential
factors for inbound and outbound M&As provide
useful insights both for firms that are interested in
entering emerging markets and for EMFs interested
in going global.
Second, our research advances the M&A comple-
tion literature. While scholars in finance, account-
ing, and strategy have recognized the failure of
M&As as an important research topic, most studies
have focused on domestic or cross-border M&As
between developed countries. Our research adds to
this literature by extending the research to a new
setting: M&As involving both a developed and an
emerging country. This extension is important
because the unique characteristics of our setting
allow us to enrich the theoretical development and
derive new insights related to M&A completion.
Specifically, we propose in this article that the M&A
direction is a moderator of completion and we
elaborate essential differences between inbound
and outbound M&As at the country-, firm-, and
deal level. We also offer empirical evidence to
demonstrate that the most influential determinants
of M&A completion differ for inbound and out-
bound transactions.
Third, our research also contributes to the liter-
ature on the determinants of cross-border M&As.
When studying the selection of host country and
target company, extant studies in this literature
stream have mainly focused on either domestic
M&As (i.e., the selection of target company) or
cross-border M&As in general without distinguish-
ing the M&A direction related to emerging markets
(e.g., Erel, Liao, & Weisbach, 2012; Rossi & Volpin,
2004). Our study provides a unique research setting
in which M&A determinant literature can also
investigate if and how the M&A direction related
to emerging markets affects country selection.
Furthermore, while extant studies have examined
how country distance affects the selection of host
country, we found the opposite effect on M&A
completion. Specifically, studies have found that
the larger the legal and regulatory differences
between the home and host countries, the more
likely it is that the host country will be selected by
the acquirer if the former can take advantage of the
latter’s weaker institutions (e.g., Erel et al., 2012;
Rossi & Volpin, 2004). Our finding regarding the
negative impact of country distance on deal com-
pletion, combined with the positive impact of
country distance on country selection, suggests
that, while a host country is more likely to be
selected if it has larger differences from the
acquirer’s home country, the acquirer may find it
difficult to complete after a public announcement.
These two opposing effects of country distance on
country selection and deal completion underline
the importance of incorporating M&A completion
into the selection of target company and host
country.
Finally, although our empirical study is based on
M&A data, the insights derived from our work may
not be limited to M&As. The potential moderator,
the direction of M&As that our research highlights,
i.e., from vs. to emerging markets, can be applied to
any type of cross-border transactions involving
emerging countries. More generally, while very
few studies have examined how the direction of
internationalization affects the performance of
globalization (e.g., the financial risk and leverage
involved in the post-internationalization stage in
Kwok & Reeb, 2000), we hope that our research,
together with these earlier studies, will stimulate
more interest in further exploring the differences
between inbound and outbound cross-border trans-
actions involving emerging countries.
The rest of the article is organized into four
sections. We first introduce the general procedure
of M&As and then highlight the specific challenges
involved in cross-border M&As. In the following
sections, we discuss the theoretical background and
develop a conceptual framework concerning the
successful driving forces of two types of cross-
border M&As. We then introduce the empirical
model, present our data, and discuss our empirical
analyses and findings. We conclude with a discus-
sion of managerial implications and opportunities
for future research.
THE M&A PROCEDURE AND DEAL
COMPLETION
In this section, we briefly explain the M&A deal
procedure in general and cross-border M&As in
particular to provide a foundation for the develop-
ment of our theoretical framework. The existing
literature on M&As has suggested that an M&A
procedure typically consists of two stages: a pre-
completion stage and a post-merger integration
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stage (Boone & Mulherin, 2007; Dikova et al.,
2010), as shown in Figure 1. The pre-completion
stage begins with the ‘‘private-takeover process’’
when an acquiring firm considers a number of
potential target companies and asks them to submit
a preliminary indication of interest (Muehlfeld
et al., 2012) or vice versa (Boone & Mulherin,
2007). After signing a confidentiality agreement,
the interested target companies receive private
information from the acquiring company and
engage in initial negotiations until one target
company has been selected (Boone & Mulherin,
2007; Dikova et al., 2010; Muehlfeld et al., 2012).1
The acquiring company will then perform a
detailed analysis (i.e., due diligence) to assess the
organizational fit with the selected target, based on
a range of criteria such as relative size, type of
business, capital structure, organizational
strengths, core competencies, and market channels,
among others. The private-takeover process ends
when the acquiring company reaches a preliminary
agreement with the target company and announces
it in the financial press, the date of which is referred
to as the ‘‘date announced’’ in Figure 1. The M&A
procedure then enters the ‘‘public-takeover pro-
cess,’’ the second period in the pre-completion
stage. During this period the acquirer will make
further objective, independent examinations (i.e.,
due diligence) of the target, focusing on financial
issues, assets and business valuation, foreign gov-
ernment regulations, and risk expropriation,
among others. Finally, both parties will decide
whether or not to close the deal (i.e., complete or
abandon it). If the M&A can be completed, then the
second period ends with the completion announce-
ment, the date of which is referred to as the ‘‘date
effective’’ in Figure 1. The second period in the pre-
completion stage, the public-takeover process, can
take several months (Dikova et al., 2010) or may
end up in failure.
In addition to this two-stage classification based
on the periods before and after a public announce-
ment, extant M&A literature has also classified the
M&A procedure into more detailed steps. For
example, Sherman (2011) has described the M&A
procedure in 12 steps: (1) develop acquisition
objectives; (2) analyze the projected economic
and financial gains to be achieved by the acquisi-
tion; (3) assemble an acquisition team (managers,
attorneys, accountants, and investment bankers)
and begin the search for the acquisition candidates;
(4) due diligence of the primary candidates; (5)
initiate negotiations and valuation of the target; (6)
identify the sources of financing for the transac-
tion; (7) detailed bidding and negotiations; (8)
obtain all shareholder and third-party consents and
approvals; (9) phase II confirmatory due diligence;
(10) structure the legal documents; (11) prepare for
the closing; and (12) hold the closing. Depending
on when these steps are implemented, i.e., before
or after the public announcement, steps 1–6 are
carried out during the private-takeover period,
while steps 7–12 are carried out during the public-
takeover period.
Compared to these general procedures in domes-
tic M&As, cross-border M&A transactions involve
greater complexity and acquirers can encounter a
higher level of unfamiliarity and uncertainties. For
instance, during the phase II confirmatory due
diligence in the public-takeover period, in addition
to a thorough evaluation of the value and risks
associated with the target, this process also requires
special attention to topics such as exchange rates,
local taxes, local accounting standards, foreign
government potential trade regulations (dividends,
fees, royalties), risk of expropriation, and debt/
equity ratios that might be imposed by the foreign
government (Kissin & Herrera, 1990). In particular,
acquirers entering developed markets also have to
pay attention to laws that require minimum
amounts of capital to be invested and must con-
sider restrictions on acquiring assets in certain
types of ‘‘national interest’’ industries (such as
defense, telecommunications, or broadcasting)
(Rosenbloom, 2002). For acquirers entering emerg-
ing markets, tasks related to legal due diligence
become even more daunting because of the absence
of a uniform commercial code-type procedures in
the target’s home country (Rosenbloom, 2002).
When examining the completion of cross-border
M&As, one might ask: What could cause the termi-
nation of an announced M&A, given that a detailed
analysis has already been performed during the
private-takeover process? The extant literature in
finance and law has suggested that the release of
new information during the public-takeover period
has significantly affected the returns and risks of the
announced deal, which may create disputes between
Private Takeover Period
Pre-Completion Stage Post-Completion Stage
Public Takeover Period
Private Initiation Date Announced Date Effective
Integration Period
Figure 1 M&A procedure.
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the acquirer and the target that could lead to
completion failure (Hotchkiss, Qian, & Song,
2005). We argue that withdrawing the announced
M&A can be caused by not only (1) a misunder-
standing of existing information or overlooking
some important information in the private-takeover
process, but also (2) unanticipated new informa-
tion/knowledge made available to firms after enter-
ing the public-takeover stage that can be the result
of unexpected changes.
For example, the assessment performed during
the private- and public-takeover periods have dif-
ferent emphases: The former is based primarily on
strategic decisions of organizational fit and strategic
compatibility, while the latter focuses on both
strategic and administrative activities related to
compliance with regulations as well as final nego-
tiations on future strategies and implementation of
announcement strategies (Muehlfeld et al., 2012).
Hence as the investigation and negotiation pro-
cesses proceed to administration and implementa-
tion issues, the two firms may identify information
that has been overlooked in the private-takeover
process, or perhaps a misinterpretation / misunder-
standing arises regarding each party’s strategic
goals or financial evaluations. A new understanding
and newly identified information may reveal some
potential conflicts between two parties and make
them reconsider and renegotiate. As a result, the
firms may have to abandon the deal if such
conflicts cannot be resolved.
Furthermore, a country’s business environment
might change during the public-takeover process; for
example, new regulations and/or new economic poli-
cies could be imposed. In response, the two firms
(acquirer and target) may have to re-evaluate the
announcedM&A’s risk and returns and renegotiate the
deal. Subsequently, one or more of the parties might
decide to withdraw if the returns of the intendedM&A
are adversely affected under the new business condi-
tions. Asmost unexpected changes are beyond a firm’s
control, the likelihood of a deal completion can be
significantly affected by these changes during the
public-takeover process. Hence, effective cross-border
learning should play a particularly important role in
the successful completion of M&As involving both
developed and emerging markets.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
In this article we study the completion of cross-
border M&As involving emerging markets during
the public-takeover process. Although a few recent
studies have investigated the completion of cross-
border M&As, this article differs from them on the
sample of cross-border M&As used and the influ-
ential factors studied. For example, Dikova et al.
(2010) studied the failure of announced M&As in
the context of service industries in developed
countries focusing on country-level factors (i.e.,
institutional environments). Three other studies
examined the influence of either industry related-
ness or firm- and deal-level factors (e.g., size,
experience, stake sought, and payment method),
respectively, on completion failure using a general
sample of cross-border M&As without considering
whether the transactions involved emerging mar-
kets (Aguilera & Dencker, 2008; Muehlfeld et al.,
2007, 2012). We examine the different influences
of three level factors (i.e., country-, firm- and deal-
level) on the completion failure of cross-border
M&As involving emerging markets.
External and Internal Cross-Border Learning
Barriers
What differences exist in the completion of cross-
border M&As involving two different economies
(i.e., developed and emerging economies)? We
propose that the fundamental differences between
those M&As involving two profoundly different
economies lie in the higher level of unfamiliarity
and uncertainty in the process of cross-border M&A
completion, which creates challenges in cross-bor-
der learning. Specifically, acquirers from two dif-
ferent economies face two learning barriers to
successfully completing cross-border M&As: (a) in-
ternal learning barriers and (b) external learning
barriers. We refer to internal learning barriers as the
obstacles within an organization that prevent cross-
border learning, such as learning resources and
capabilities, while external learning barriers include
obstacles that prevent organizational learning of
the host country’s business environment such as
law, regulations, economy, and culture. Compared
with developed countries, emerging countries often
lack transparent and stable legislation and regula-
tions for doing business and thus have relatively
higher external learning barriers. Compared with
acquirers from developed countries, acquirers from
emerging markets are newcomers in global markets
and thus have relatively higher internal learning
barriers. These fundamental differences in cross-
border learning imply that the factors influencing
the failure to complete announced M&As can be
different for inbound and outbound M&As. In this
article we identify three levels of influential factors
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that can either lower or heighten these learning
barriers and hence generate different moderating
effects of M&A direction on the completion of
cross-border M&As.
Country-Level Factors
The differences between home and host country
can strongly affect the failure rate of cross-border
M&As. Specifically, the larger the differences
between the legal and regulatory environments in
the home and host countries, the more challenging
it is for acquirers to overcome external learning
barriers. As a result, it is more likely for acquirers to
encounter unexpected changes and/or uncover
information misunderstood or overlooked, which
increases the chance of failure to complete an
announced M&A. Using a general sample of cross-
border M&As between developed countries in the
service industry, Dikova et al. (2010) have shown
that completion is negatively affected by institu-
tional differences, measured as the country-risk
distance between home and host countries. In this
article we examine the impacts of both legal and
regulatory distance and country-risk distance on the
completion failure of cross-border M&As to versus
from emerging markets. The former distance mea-
sures status quo differences in the legal and regu-
latory environments between the home and host
countries while the latter measures differences
between the two countries in the likelihood of
dramatic changes that may be caused by political
and economic forces in the business environment.
Legal and Regulatory Distance
This factor captures two countries’ differences in
laws and regulations that are related to business
and is also known as the difference in the ‘‘rules of
the game in a society’’ (North, 1990). According to
institutional theory, institutions that comprise the
rules of a society or ‘‘humanly devised constraints
that shape human interaction’’ (North, 1990), are
nation-specific (Dikova et al., 2010); that is, the
rules of the game vary across nations. Some rules
may be unique to a jurisdiction or incompatible
with other nations. In addition, nearly every juris-
diction has its own stock exchange rules, securities
laws, and corporate law statutes (Keegan & Green,
2011). When two countries differ greatly in terms
of legal and regulatory environments, firms
involved in cross-border M&As may encounter
complexities that cannot be fully interpreted (and
comprehended) based on their native knowledge
and skills (Dikova et al., 2010). As a result, firms
may misjudge the chances of success for an M&A or
overlook some important aspects related to the
deal. If the parties realize such misjudgments or
negligence only after the M&A is announced, they
may have to abandon the deal during the public-
takeover period. A relatively recent example, the
failure of the China National Offshore Oil Corpo-
ration (CNOOC)’s effort to acquire the US oil
company Unocal, illustrates the underestimation
of political risk. Soon after CNOOC made an
acquisition bid of $18.5 billion in cash for Unocal
on June 23, 2005, there was strong opposition in
Washington, which continued to grow and even-
tually forced the company to withdraw its bid. As
expressed by CNOOC in a written statement, ‘‘the
political environment has made it very difficult for
us to accurately assess our chance of success,
creating a level of uncertainty that presents an
unacceptable risk to our ability to secure this
transaction’’ (The Washington Post, August 2005).
Country-Risk Distance
Country risk refers to the risk of investing in a
country in which drastic changes may adversely
affect profits or the value of assets (e.g., Rothaer-
mel, Kotha, & Steensma, 2006; Johnson & Tellis,
2008). The overall country risk in an international
market can come from both man-made (e.g.,
political and economic risks in business environ-
ment) and non-man-made sources (e.g., natural
disasters). In the business environment, political
risk ‘‘is the possibility of a change in a country’s
political environment or government policy that
would adversely affect a company’s ability to
operate effectively and profitably’’ (Keegan &
Green, 2011, p. 129). Such changes can range from
extreme forms such as expropriation, civil disorder,
or ethnic conflict, to less extreme forms such as tax
increases, exchange-rate control, and imposition of
tariffs and restrictions on foreign investment (Kee-
gan & Green, 2011). Similarly, economic risks,
including financial risks, refer to ‘‘economic forces
that may result in drastic changes in the business
environment which are detrimental to foreign
business’’ (Rothaermel et al., 2006, p. 59). Some
economic risks that foreign businesses often
encounter could be in the form of recessions or
market downturns, currency crises, or sudden
bursts of inflation (Johnson & Tellis, 2008).
Country-risk distance can affect deal completion
in three ways. First, the higher the country-risk
distance, the more likely that the country with
higher risk (either home or host country) may
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encounter adverse changes in its political or eco-
nomic environment during the public-takeover
period. Such adverse changes may either reduce
the potential of the announced M&A or entail
losses to firms involved, which in turn reduces the
likelihood of deal completion. Second, even
adverse changes may not significantly affect the
M&A outcome; such changes could create new
information for firms involved in the M&A to
comprehend in the short public-takeover period.
Due to time pressure after the M&A is announced,
misunderstanding and misjudging unexpected pos-
sibilities regarding the announced M&A increases
the likelihood of a firm abandoning the deal. Third,
drastic changes can also create great uncertainty for
firms involved in the M&A concerning future
market stability and hence can reduce confidence
in doing business in such an unstable environment.
Overall, as country-risk distance enlarges, the like-
lihood of adverse changes can significantly increase
in the high-risk country, which in turn decreases
the likelihood of deal completion.
Inbound vs. Outbound
Considering the inbound and outbound M&As, we
expect that the direction of cross-border M&As (i.e.,
inbound vs. outbound) moderates the impact of
country-level factors, that is, legal and regulatory
distance and country-risk distance on an
announced M&A completion. Specifically, we
expect that the negative impacts of the two coun-
try-level factors are stronger on the completion of
inbound M&As than on outbound M&As.
Earlier, we suggested that, when the distance in
two countries’ legal and regulatory environment is
large, firms involved in cross-border M&As may
encounter difficulties in fully understanding the
legal and regulatory requirements of the host
country based on their native knowledge and skills
and, as a result, may misinterpret or neglect some
important aspects in completing the deal. Such
misinterpretation and/or negligence can severely
impede the announced M&A completion during
the public-takeover period. Compared with out-
bound M&As, it is more likely for firms involved in
inbound M&As to encounter such misinterpreta-
tion and/or negligence and consequently withdraw
from the deal. Note that inbound M&As involve
acquirers from developed countries merging with
or acquiring firms from emerging markets. Unlike
developed countries that have established relatively
concrete, comprehensive, and transparent legisla-
tion and regulations for doing business, emerging
markets often lack such legislation and regulations
for doing business (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, &
Borza, 2000). In emerging markets, business may be
conducted based on the interpretation of individ-
ual officials in charge of starting and operating a
business (Henisz & Zelner, 2010). In a business
environment with murky laws and poorly defined
legislation and regulations, acquirers from devel-
oped countries often find it hard to fully under-
stand how to do business (The Washington Post,
April 2, 2011). This significantly increases the
likelihood of misunderstanding and negligence
and in turn reduces the chances of success of the
announced inbound M&As. In contrast, while
acquirers from emerging markets still must exert
great effort in understanding the legal and regula-
tory requirements for their intended M&As in
developed countries, it is relatively easier for them
to comprehend the process, as the legal and
regulatory systems in developed markets are usually
transparent and stable. Thus the chance for misun-
derstanding and negligence is relatively lower for
outbound than for inbound M&As, and, as a result,
the distance in the legal and regulatory environ-
ment between developed and emerging countries
negatively impacts the deal completion of the
announced outbound M&As to a lesser extent than
that of inbound M&As.
Similarly, we expect the negative impact of
country-risk distance on deal completion to be
higher for inbound than for outbound M&As. In
general, the level of country risk is inversely related
to a country’s stage of economic development
(Keegan and Green 2004, p. 156).
Compared with developed economies, emerging
markets have a relatively higher level of country
risk with a higher probability of change in their
political and economic environments. Such
changes can be a sudden government regime
change due to a history of political strife, tax
increases, exchange rate control, or imposition of
foreign-investment tariffs and restrictions because
of rapid economic reforms (Arnold & Quelch,
1998). As reported in The Washington Post (April 2,
2011), many foreign investors have been frustrated
by India’s unpredictable tax policies. Vodafone, the
global telecommunications giant, for example, was
slapped with a $2.5 billion capital gains charge in
India for an unprecedented interpretation of the
country’s tax law. Consequently, the US and British
ambassadors, the European Commission, and four
other countries wrote to India’s finance minister
that ‘‘the growing unpredictability in India’s tax
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policies creates unquantifiable risks in investment
planning,’’ and they were concerned that ‘‘this
uncertainty could affect the confidence of those
thinking of investing in the Indian market’’ (The
Washington Post, April 2, 2011).2 A World Bank
study in 2004 revealed that 15% to 30% of
contracts covering $371 billion of private infras-
tructure investment in the 1990s were subject to
government-initiated renegotiations or disputes in
emerging markets (Henisz & Zelner, 2010).
As many of these political and economic changes
are difficult to foresee in emerging markets, acquir-
ers from developed countries may be subject to
changes that prove to be detrimental after the
announcement of an inbound M&A deal in the
emerging market and, consequently, may be forced
to withdraw from the deal. Conversely, in a devel-
oped country, the host country in the outbound
M&A tends to have more entrepreneur-friendly
regulations, better protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights, less corruption, and more transparent
and better-functioning capital markets, all of which
makes the outcome easier to forecast. Thus due to
the fast-changing and highly uncertain emerging-
market environment, the negative impact of coun-
try-risk distance on deal completion might be
higher for inbound relative to outbound M&As.
However, it is also possible that the negative
impact of country-level distances on deal comple-
tion is stronger for outbound than for inbound
M&As. While the legal and regulatory requirements
for M&As in developed countries are much more
stable and transparent as compared to those in
emerging markets, which makes it easier for emerg-
ing market companies to learn, such requirements
are sometimes so high and strict that emerging-
market companies find adherence difficult when
acquiring or merging with a developed-market
company. Consider the legal and regulatory
requirements regarding foreign M&As in the US.
For example, an M&A case may be subject to a
number of regulatory approvals from federal, state,
and local offices after it is publicly announced.
Such approvals may include a national security
review, an antitrust review, other reviews by the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS), labor union reviews, corporate
governance and securities regulation considera-
tions, industry-specific approvals, and shareholder
approval, among others (Fagan 2009).
These types of regulatory reviews and public
scrutiny (e.g., from shareholders and employees)
can raise some challenging issues that emerging-
market acquirers may find unexpected and hard
to address. For example, if national security
concerns arise, developed-market governments
can block the deal if the emerging-market acquir-
ers are partly or wholly government-owned. As
reported in many news outlets, such national
security concerns by CFIUS was in fact the reason
for the recent failure of the Chinese telecommu-
nications company Huawei Technologies, Ltd. to
acquire the cloud computing-related technology
of 3leaf Systems, Inc., an insolvent US firm
(Lexology, April 15, 2011). Although the US
Bureau of Industry and Security in the US Depart-
ment of Commerce had approved the deal,
Huawei was surprised that CFIUS did not agree
with the Bureau’s actions and disapproved the
deal (Lexology, April 15, 2011). Given the exis-
tence of the large number of government-owned
and -operated companies in emerging markets
(Sheth, 2011), such type of political risk in
developed markets can impose a stronger negative
impact on deal completion if country-level dis-
tances become significantly larger. As both the
Huawei and CNOOC examples showed, although
the emerging-market companies may have pre-
pared and expected a thorough review from the
developed markets, intense opposition can still
result in an unexpected outcome (The Washington
Post, August 2005).
In addition to these regulatory compliance issues,
an M&A deal can be assessed by other stakeholders
in terms of how their interests are aligned on the
transaction. Employee resistance to an announced
M&A transaction could push the emerging-market
acquirers to withdraw the deal. Apollo Tyre, an
Indian acquirer, experienced a failed deal for the US
target, Cooper Tire and Rubber Company, report-
edly due in part to issues with the US United
Steelworkers union (The New York Times, 2013).
After Apollo announced its $2.5 billion bid for
Cooper on June 12, 2013, the union filed grie-
vances with Cooper on August 1, 2013, contending
for a renegotiation of its contract with Apollo to
represent steelworkers’ concerns. Due to the con-
tract renegotiating costs with United Steelworkers,
Apollo failed to reach an agreement on a new stock
purchase price with Cooper, which then termi-
nated the announced deal at the end of 2013
(Reuters, 2013).
Based on the above arguments, we develop two
competing hypotheses regarding the moderating
effect of cross-border M&A direction on deal
completion:
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Hypothesis 1: (Country-Level: Distance in
Country Law and Regulation):
The relationship between deal completion and
distance in country law and regulation is
(a) more negative for inbound than for outbound
M&As;
(b) less negative for inbound than for outbound
M&As.
Hypothesis 2: (Country-Level: Distance in
Country-Risk):
The relationship between deal completion and
distance in country-risk distance is
(a) more negative for inbound than for outbound
M&As;
(b) less negative for inbound than for outbound
M&As.
Firm-Level Factors
Compared with country-level factors that are mostly
beyond a firm’s control and represent main chal-
lenges that acquirers encounter in learning about the
host country, firm-specific learning resources and
capabilities (i.e., financial capability, human
resources, and cross-border M&A knowledge) can
significantly enhance the success of global entry
(Johnson & Tellis, 2008). However, acquirers in the
two types of cross-border M&A face internal learning
barriers to a different extent and this is reflected in
firms’ experiential learning. The organizational and
economics literature in experiential learning have
generally established that experience can create a
positive learning effect on firm performance (e.g.,
Yelle, 1979; Dutton, Thomas, & Butler, 1984; Levitt
&March, 1988). Such an experiential learning effect,
also referred to as the learning-curve effect, has been
found extensively in the context of manufacturing
(e.g., Yelle, 1979; Dutton, Thomas, & Butler, 1984;
Levitt & March, 1988). In the M&A context, Fowler
and Schmidt (1989) and Barkema, Bell, and Pennings
(1996) also found a positive impact of past acquisi-
tion experience on post-integration performance. In
recent decades, some scholars have started to inves-
tigate the learning effects from a previous success
and/or failure experience on M&A performance
(Hayward, 2002; Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan
2006; Muehlfeld, Sahib, & van Witteloostuijn
2012). However, none of these authors have exam-
ined the moderating effect of M&A direction on
experiential learning from past success and failure in
M&A completion. Built on the resource-based-view
literature and the organizational learning literature,
we expect that two firm-level factors, i.e., success and
failure experience regarding cross-border M&As, can
affect the completion of M&As to vs. from emerging
markets in different ways.
Experiential Learning from Prior Completion Success
The behavioral theory of the firm suggests that
decision makers interpret success experience as
evidence that existing organizational knowledge
adequately represents the world (Madsen & Desai,
2010) and that success experience leads to persis-
tence in future actions (Haleblian, Kim, & Rajago-
palan, 2006). In the context of M&A completion,
previous M&A-completion experience enables com-
panies to accumulate important information that
should be assessed and anticipated (e.g., what regu-
latory barriers may exist in the host country) and
how they canbetter negotiate andprepare respective
strategies when encountering obstacles during the
public-takeover process. Furthermore, because this
knowledge of a specific host country has been
successfully approved in previous M&As, acquirers
mayhave developed organizational routines onhow
to repeatedly implement strategies during the take-
over process and how to access outside financial,
legal, or other resources (Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath,
& Pisano, 2004). In turn, such reinforcement can
increase the likelihood of completing future M&As.
Experiential Learning from Prior Completion Failure
In contrast to prior M&A success that represents a
correct understanding of the M&A procedure
required in a host country and promotes persistent
behavior, the organizational learning literature sug-
gests that prior failure indicates to decision makers
that their existing knowledge is inadequate and
strategic changes are needed (Madsen & Desai,
2010). To improve performance, decision makers
must detect gaps in existing knowledge or reevaluate
current strategies of what went wrong and engage in
a problemistic search to find solutions or alternative
strategies (Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006). In
the context of completing an announced deal, the
failure to complete a past M&A represents flaws in
the M&A procedure, an inadequate understanding,
or a misunderstanding of the host country’s regula-
tions and/or the target’s valuation. To enhance the
success of subsequentM&As in the host country, the
acquirer must identify the correct reasons for the
failure and generate superior solutions. However,
learning from failure is difficult and returns from
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failure experiential learning are much more uncer-
tain (March, 1991). For cross-border M&As, failure
experiential learning requires the acquirer to pre-
cisely identify what modification is needed, what
information has been overlooked and/or misunder-
stood, what institutional changes should be pre-
pared, and how to implement themodification so as
to ensure success. Given the complexity, unfamil-
iarity, and uncertainty involved in cross-border
M&As, this task is extremely difficult, in that the
acquirer may pursue a wrong modification or inap-
propriately implement amodification that may lead
to a further failure. Hence learning from failure may
create a less positive impact on the completion
likelihood of subsequent M&As.
Inbound vs. Outbound
In this article we explicitly compare the learning
effects of past M&A success (i.e., the number of prior
M&As completed) and failure experience (i.e., the
number of prior M&As that failed to complete) on
the completion of inbound- and outbound M&As.
On the one hand, because emerging-market acquir-
ers are new to global M&As and have limited
knowledge of the process, they tend to benefit more
from experiential learning than do acquirers from
developed countries. This is especially true for
experiential learning from prior success. Experien-
tial learning from prior success can be different in
developed markets compared with that in emerging
markets, because different levels of learning barriers
exist. Specifically, because the business environment
(i.e., legal and regulatory environment) is relatively
stable over time in developed countries but is fast-
changing in emerging markets, it can be relatively
easier for acquirers from emerging markets to apply
their knowledge from past success experience to a
new M&A in developed economies. In contrast,
learning fromprior success for acquirers in emerging
markets (i.e., in inbound M&As) requires them to
stay alert to environmental changes in suchmarkets
and make necessary changes to their M&A routines
when applying past success experiences. However,
the organizational learning literature has pointed
out that repeated behavior can make firms overcon-
fident in their knowledge, which, in turn, can
decrease the incentive to search for improvements
and changes (Greve, 2003). Experienced acquirers,
such as those involved in inbound M&As, may
become unresponsive to environmental changes
and hence are less likely to make necessary changes
when repeating past success, which potentially
reduces the completion probability of subsequent
M&As. Thus the learning effect from success expe-
rience tends to benefit emerging-market acquirers
more in completing cross-border M&As than their
counterparts from developed countries.
On the other hand, although developed-market
acquirers may encounter higher external-learning
barriers and lower internal-learning motivations, as
discussed earlier, they may have higher internal-
learning resources and capabilities that have been
accumulated from their past experience. If they
realize minor modifications or incremental changes
needed when applying their past success experience
to the new M&A, developed-market acquirers may
be capable of performing better than their coun-
terparts from emerging markets. This capability can
lead to a more positive learning-from-success effect
for developed-market acquirers than for emerging-
market ones. Given these discussions, we propose
two competing hypotheses regarding the experien-
tial learning effects from past success.
Hypothesis 3: (Firm-Level: Past Success
Experience):
(a) The relationship between deal completion
and past success experience in completion is
more positive for outbound than for inbound
M&As;
(b) The relationship between deal completion
and past success experience in completion is
less positive for outbound than for inbound
M&As.
We now consider experiential learning from
failure. Because emerging-market acquirers are less
experienced than their developed-market counter-
parts in completing cross-border M&As, they may
be less likely to engage in such a problemistic
search. For example, Haleblian and Finkelstein
(1999) suggested that novices primarily represent
problems with obvious or surface-level informa-
tion, whereas experts in acquisition can see prob-
lems from both surface and underlying levels.
Hence emerging-market acquirers are probably less
capable than developed-market acquirers of dis-
cerning the correct problem in prior failure and
finding corresponding solutions. This lack of capa-
bility can lead to a less positive learning from past
failure for emerging-market acquirers than for their
counterparts from developed economies.
However, while emerging-market acquirers are
less experienced and may be also less capable of
deep reflection, they have a stronger learning
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motivation and are more open to making organi-
zational changes (Greve, 2003). Learning from
failure very often requires making radical changes
and taking greater risks (Muehlfeld et al., 2012)
and, thus, if emerging-market acquirers can obtain
external resources (e.g., consulting companies) to
help them conduct problemistic searches and
identify radical solutions for success, they tend to
be more willing to implement changes, compared
to experienced acquirers who tend to have higher
organizational inertia for taking risks and making
radical changes. Based on these analyses, we also
propose two competing hypotheses regarding expe-
riential learning from past failure.
Hypothesis 4: (Firm-Level: Past Failure
Experience):
(a) The relationship between deal completion
and past failure experience in completion is
more positive for outbound than for inbound
M&As;
(b) The relationship between deal completion
and past failure experience in completion is
less positive for outbound than for inbound
M&As.
Deal-Level Factors
Unlike country distance variables, which can
heighten acquirers’ external learning barriers, and
firm-level variables (i.e., M&A success experience),
which can lower acquirers’ internal learningbarriers,
deal-specific financial factors can influence both
internal and external learning barriers of the
acquirer. Specifically, deal-level factors such as stake
sought and cash payment can, on the one hand,
lower acquirers’ external learning barriers but on the
other hand, raise acquirers’ internal learning barri-
ers. As a result, the net impact of deal-level variables
may depend on the direction of cross-border M&As.
We specifically investigate the impact of two deal-
level factors, stake sought and cash payment,
because these two variables represent acquirers’
financial commitment to the host country’s econ-
omy,which can reduce external learning barriers but
create high internal learning barriers for acquirers.
Stake Sought
Stake sought refers to the percentage of ownership
stake that an acquirer seeks in the target firm
(Muehlfeld et al., 2007; Dikova et al., 2010). For
M&A transactions with higher percentages of stake
sought, target companies may be more willing to
cooperatewith acquirers during both the private and
public takeover periods if they have a strong need for
financial investment. This cooperation can help
acquirers reduce their external learning barriers in
host countries and target companies. For example,
target companies may be more willing to provide
detailed company information to acquirers during
the private-takeover period. It is also more likely for
target companies to make concessions in the face of
adverse changes during the public-takeover stage in
order to secure the transaction.However, as the stake
sought becomes larger, the deal also becomes more
complicated and risky (e.g., antitrust laws and other
legal requirements might become more sophisti-
cated as higher percentages of ownership are about
to be transferred), and the acquirer has to devote
more resources to carefully evaluate and negotiate in
order to minimize potential misunderstanding of
information and/or legal negligence. This situation
greatly increases internal learning hurdles, which
can adversely affect deal completion.
Method of Payment
Method of payment plays an important role in a
deal completion. Typically, an M&A transaction
can be processed by cash, stock, debt or any
combination thereof (Muehlfeld et al., 2007).
Compared to stock payment, deals with cash
payments may be more likely to successfully close
because cash payment is the most simple payment
method with a high-speed settlement and thor-
ough ownership transferral (Shimizu et al., 2004),
and the role of buyer and seller is clear-cut. The
case of stock payment is much more complex,
however. As an offer is negotiated based on the
market valuations of both the acquiring and target
companies’ stock price during the private-takeover
period, any market fluctuation after an M&A deal
announcement can create incentives for both
companies to renegotiate the deal offer, which
increases the likelihood of failure if an agreement
is not reached. On the other hand, a cash payment
can create a strong financial burden to acquirers
compared to a stock payment, and can require
extreme care in evaluating both the host country
and the target company, as well as negotiating
with the target. Similarly, this can also create high
internal learning challenges during both the pri-
vate- and public-takeover periods, which may
increase the probability for acquirers to withdraw
from the announced deal if the acquirer foresees
any risks.
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Inbound vs. Outbound
The net impact of stake sought and cash payment
on deal completion can depend on the financial
needs of the target company and target country,
which affects the relative strength of external- and
internal learning barriers for inbound and out-
bound M&As. Specifically, for inbound M&As, the
benefit of stake sought and cash payment in
reducing external barriers may dominate the neg-
ative influence in increasing internal learning bar-
riers and, accordingly, the two deal-level variables
can create a more positive impact on deal comple-
tion of inbound M&As. As the host country in
inbound M&A deals, emerging markets are in
greater need of capital investment to advance their
local economies and improve living standards than
are developed markets. Because a higher percentage
of stake sought and/or cash payment by acquirers
from developed markets signals a higher commit-
ment to the target companies in developing mar-
kets and implies larger contributions to the local
economy, the targets and local governments can be
highly motivated to use all means to secure the
completion of an announced M&A deal.
Local governments also have incentives to
provide preferential incentives and design various
localized favorable policies for foreign acquirers
from developed countries during both private- and
public-takeover periods. For instance, to attract a
large foreign investment, a local government may
take such measures as selling land at an extremely
low price or even giving it away, or providing tax
and fee reductions or exemptions to foreign
acquirers (Li, 2007). Zhengning County in China’s
Gansu province issued a policy that included ‘‘zero
rental’’ for qualified projects with 1–5 million RMB
and a free land transfer for investments of more
than 5 million RMB in order to attract foreign
investment from developed countries (Li, 2007).
With this type of strong support from local
government, it is more likely that the emerging-
market targets would be determined to carefully
prepare and negotiate with the developed-market
acquirer during the private-takeover period and to
resolve any dispute that occurs during the public-
takeover period. Even if a local government has to
modify its laws and regulations when undertaking
economic and political reforms during the period
after an M&A deal is announced, it is less likely
that the policy changes would create any adverse
effect on the announced deal given the higher
stakes and/or larger cash investment the devel-
oped-market acquirers contribute.
However, for emerging-market acquirers in out-
bound M&As, a larger percentage of stake sought
and a full cash payment may indicate both higher
internal- and external-learning barriers. As financial
needs are relatively lower in developed countries
than in emerging markets, emerging-market
acquirers may encounter situations in which target
companies are less willing to collaborate or even
resist collaboration if a larger percentage of stake is
sought or a full cash payment is offered by these
acquirers. This lack of cooperation can increase the
acquirers’ internal learning barriers, as they may
find it hard to obtain information from or negotiate
with the target. At the same time, because a larger
percentage of stake sought and/or full cash pay-
ment also signal higher acquirer control in the
target company (Muehlfeld et al., 2007), they may
create management resistance and/or national
security concerns from the host country govern-
ment. As a result, for outbound M&As, a larger
stake sought and cash payment cannot help reduce
external learning barriers, but rather increases both
external- and internal learning barriers. Thus the
impact of a larger stake sought and cash payment
on deal completion may be negative for outbound
M&As. Therefore we propose the following
hypotheses regarding the moderating effect of
cross-border M&A direction on the impact of deal-
level financial variables (Figure 2).
Hypothesis 5: (Deal-Level: Stake Sought)
The relationship between a deal’s percentage of
stake sought and completion rate is
(a) positive for inbound M&As;
(b) negative for outbound M&As.
Hypothesis 6: (Deal-Level: Cash Payment)
Deal-Level Factors:
Stake Sought
Full Cash
Cross-Border 
M&A Completion
M&A Direction:
IN vs. OUT
Country-Level Factors:
Legal and Regulatory
Distance
Country Risk Distance
Firm-Level Factors:
M&A Success Experience
M&A Failure Experience
Figure 2 Theoretical framework of cross-border M&A
completion to vs. from emerging markets.
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The relationship between cash (rather than
stock) payment and completion rate is
(a) positive for inbound M&As;
(b) negative for outbound M&As.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Model
We apply a probit model to estimate how the
completion likelihood of a cross-border M&A is
affected by country-, firm- and deal-level factors
(e.g., Muehlfeld et al., 2007, 2012; Dikova et al.,
2010). Specifically, the probability of a deal com-
pletion is assumed to be a probit function of
exploratory variables such as country-, firm-, and
deal-level variables, as well as other control vari-
ables. That is,
PrðCompletioniÞ ¼ UðXibÞ; ð1Þ
where Xi is a vector of explanatory variables with
coefficient b being a vector of parameter estimates.
i is an indicator of M&A deals. Notation Pr denotes
the probability of deal completion and U denotes
the cumulative distribution function of standard
normal distribution. The empirical specification for
function Xib is given by
Xib ¼ b0 þ b1law reg disi þ b2country risk disi
þ b3Exp succi þ b4Exp faili þ b5Stakei
þ b6Cashi þ b7Sizei þ b8law reg disi
 outi þ b9country risk disi  outi
þ b10Exp suci  outi þ b11Exp faili
 outi þ b12Stakei  outi þ b13Cashi
 outi þ b14Sizei  outi
þ b15outi þ b1623controli þ ei ð2Þ
where law_reg_disi and country_risk_disi denote
the country distance in law and regulation and in
country risk between the home and host countries
at the time an M&A deal i is announced, respec-
tively. Firm-level variables Exp_succi and Exp_faili
denote the respective acquirer’s success and failure
experience in completing past M&As. The variable
Sizei denotes the acquirer’s size, outi is set to 1 for
the outbound M&A i, and 0 for the inbound M&A
i. We also incorporate two deal-level financial
variables Stakei and Cashi, which denote the per-
centage of stake sought and full cash payment by
the acquiring firm, respectively. The vector controli
includes all other country-, firm- and deal-level
variables, which we explain in detail in the fol-
lowing section. Thus the coefficients b1–7 capture
the main effect of country-, firm- and deal-level
variables on the likelihood of deal completion
(when b8–15 = 0), while the coefficients of the
interaction terms between country- and firm-level
variables and variable outi, b8–13, capture the
moderating effects of M&A direction on cross-bor-
der M&A completion, which are hypothesized in
H1–H6. b16–23 is a vector of coefficients of control
variables.
Data
We collect cross-border M&As related to emerging
markets from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions
Database. This database provides comprehensive
information on worldwide M&A deals on the date
of a cross-border M&A announcement, completion
status, acquirer and target information, and deal-
specific information. The database has been exten-
sively used in academic research on M&As in
management, finance, international business, and
marketing (e.g., Dikova et al., 2010; Swaminathan,
Murshed, & Hulland, 2008; Beckman & Haun-
schild, 2002).
To empirically examine and compare the impact
of country-, firm-, and deal-level factors on the
completion of the two types of cross-border M&As,
we construct two samples: inbound M&As and
outbound M&As. The inbound sample consists of
all publicly disclosed M&As whose acquirers are
from developed countries and whose targets are
firms in one of four emerging markets, BRIC. The
outbound sample consists of all publicly disclosed
M&As whose acquirers are firms from one of the
BRIC markets and whose targets are firms in
developed countries. We focus on the cross-border
M&As that expanded to or from these four leading
emerging markets, as they have become some of
fastest-growing markets in the world economy.
These deals have accounted for 80% of total cross-
border M&As involving emerging markets in the
last decade.3 Following Burgess and Steenkamp
(2006), we use the FTSE Group’s classification of
‘‘Developed Markets’’ to classify 24 developed
countries in our two samples, including the US,
the UK, Canada, Japan, France, Australia, Germany,
the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Italy, Bel-
gium, Finland, Spain, Norway, Denmark, Iceland,
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New Zealand, Austria, Luxembourg, Greece, Portu-
gal, Hong Kong, and Singapore.4
Cross-border M&As in our two samples span the
years from 1995 to 2010, a period that includes the
time in the l990s when many of these leading firms
started going global. To identify reliable and mean-
ingful data, we further select cross-border M&As in
which acquirers are public firms (target firms might
be either public or private firms). Focusing on
publicly traded acquirers allows us to collect rich
financial information regarding acquirers in our
samples. Overall, our inbound and outbound sam-
ples comprise 2,736 and 747 cross-border M&As,
respectively.5 Table 1 provides the distribution
statistics of the cross-border M&As in our two
samples by market, time span, and completion
status (see other distribution statistics of our
sample by industry and by specific countries in
Appendix A).
Variables
Deal Completion
The dependent variable in our empirical analysis is
the completion status of announced M&As. Fol-
lowing the literature (e.g., Bao & Edmans, 2009;
Muehlfeld et al., 2007, 2012; Dikova et al., 2010),
we define deal completion to be 1 if the deal is
completed and 0 otherwise. As stated earlier, the
Thomson SDC’s M&A database provides informa-
tion concerning the announced M&As on the dates
of announcement and completion, as well as the
completion status (e.g., withdraw or pending).
According to the literature, the median number of
days to completion is about 62, with 94% of all
deals completed within a year (e.g., Muehlfeld
et al., 2012). Within our sample related to emerging
markets, the mean number of days to completion is
68 for all deals, with 77 days for the inbound
sample and 44 days for the outbound sample,
respectively. Thus we considered the cross-border
M&As that were pending until April of 2013, which
is two and half years after 2010, to be withdrawn
and coded their completion status as 0.
Legal and Regulatory Distance
Following the management and international-busi-
ness literature (e.g., Meyer et al., 2009; Gubbi et al.,
2010), we use the economic freedom index devel-
oped by the Heritage Foundation to construct our
variable for country law and regulation distance
between home and host countries. This index
provides freedom scores measuring the ease of
individuals and firms to pursue their business
activities in a country in 10 categories graded on a
scale of 0–100. As we focus on the freedom of a
foreign firm to acquire and merge the home
country’s partner, we use a country’s freedom
scores in four categories, business freedom, invest-
ment freedom, financial freedom, and fiscal free-
dom, to derive an average score in the prior 2 years
to proxy a country’s legal and regulatory environ-
ment. We then measure the distance in law and
regulation between two countries as the absolute
Table 1 Inbound and outbound M&As distribution
Inbound M&A (n = 2736) Outbound M&A (n = 747)
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Emerging markets
China 1275 46.6 186 24.9
India 561 20.5 443 59.3
Brazil 567 20.7 84 11.2
Russia 333 12.2 34 4.5
Developed countries
North America 972 35.5 322 43.1
Europe 996 35.4 236 31.6
Asiaa 768 28.1 189 25.3
Time span
1995–1999 418 15.3 29 3.9
2000–2004 737 26.9 140 18.7
2005–2010 1581 57.8 578 77.4
Completion status
Completed 1798 65.7 504 67.5
Uncompleted 938 34.3 243 32.5
Note: aIncluding developed countries in Asia, Australia and New Zealand.
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difference of their average freedom scores. Accord-
ingly, the higher the variable value, the larger the
distance in law and regulation between the two
countries.
Country-Risk Distance
In line with the literature (e.g., Johnson & Tellis,
2008; Dikova et al., 2010), we derive the country-
risk distance using the country-risk score from the
PRS Group’s International Risk Guide, which pro-
vides a three-dimensional measure for each country
on political, financial, and economic risk. Specifi-
cally, following Johnson and Tellis (2008), we first
develop a composite country-risk measure for each
country (see the explanation in the PRS Group’s
International Risk Guide and Johnson and Tellis
2008). We then measure the country-risk distance
as the absolute difference between the country-risk
score of the host and home country. Thus the
higher the variable value, the larger the country risk
distance between two countries involved.
Firm Size and M&A Experience
Similar to the previous literature (e.g., Gubbi et al.,
2010; Johnson & Tellis, 2008), we measure the size
of the acquirer as a natural logarithm of the
acquirer’s average total assets over 2 years prior to
the deal announcement. Total assets are collected
from Datastream and Thomson Research. Past M&A
success (failure) experience is measured as the total
number of completed (uncompleted) cross-border
M&A deals by acquirers in the same host country as
the focal M&A deal prior to that deal.
Stake Sought and Cash
We measure Stake Sought by using the percentage of
stake that the acquirer seeks in the target firm when
the focal M&A is announced and Cash to capture
the payment method of the focal M&A deals when
they are announced, such that Cash = 1 if the deal
is paid totally through cash and 0 otherwise.
Control Variables
We adopt Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions to
measure the cultural distance between the home
and host country in the focal cross-border M&A
(Geert, 1991). Specifically, we compute the cultural
distance as
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
P
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s
" #,
4, where SA,i and
ST,i denote the cultural scores of both home and
host countries on cultural dimension i. We also
incorporate geographic distance, which is
measured as the distance between two capital cities
of two countries involved in the M&A, following
the literature (e.g., Habib & Zurawicki, 2002).
Following Aguilera and Dencker (2008), we mea-
sure Industry Relatedness to be 1 if the two SIC codes
of the target and acquirer in the focal cross-border
M&A are the same and 0 otherwise. The SIC codes
are available from the Thomson M&A Database. We
incorporate the target-firm’s ownership status, Tar-
get Status, in our empirical analysis, such as Target
Status = 1 when the target is a public firm and 0
otherwise. Furthermore, we also control some deal-
specific variables as provided in the Thomson M&A
Database. Specifically, two dummy variables are
incorporated such that Disclose = 1 if the transac-
tion value of the deal is reported in the SDC dataset
and 0 otherwise, and Attitude = 1 if the manager
perceived the deal as a friendly M&A and 0
otherwise. To capture market dynamics, we denote
that Competing Bidders = 1 if a third party launched
an offer for the target while this original bid was
pending. Finally, we also control for fixed-year
effects, fixed acquirer-country and fixed host-coun-
try effects, as well as fixed acquirer-industry and
fixed target-industry effects on deal completion.
The descriptive statistics of all variables are reported
in Table 2.
Results
We estimate the model in Eqs. (1) and (2) by using
a full sample with both the inbound and outbound
samples combined. To show the main effects of the
country, firm-, and deal-level factors on deal com-
pletion, we first estimate a main-effect model by
excluding the interaction terms of these three-level
factors with the variable Out. We then estimate a
full model with both the main effects and interac-
tion terms included. The estimation results are
presented in the columns of Model 1 and Model 2
in Table 3, respectively. Because both the Goldfeld–
Quandt test (p\0.01) and White’s test (p\0.01)
indicated that heteroskedasticity might be a poten-
tial issue for our data, we use the corrected white
co-variance matrix in both probit-regression esti-
mations to correct the heteroskedasticity issue. We
also examined the multicollinearity issue. The
variance-inflation factors of all our variables, which
are within acceptable levels (\10), indicate that the
variables are not subject to multicollinearity. Over-
all, as shown in Table 3, Model 2 (i.e., the full
model) fits better than Model 1 (i.e., the main-
effect model).
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Impacts of Country-Level Factors
As shown in Model 1 of Table 3, the coefficient of
country law and regulation distance is significantly
negative (b1 = -0.012, p\0.1) although the coef-
ficient of country-risk distance is insignificant
(b2 = 0.003, p[0.1). Similarly, as shown in Model
2 of Table 3, the main effects of country law and
regulation distance and country-risk distance
remain the same after the moderating effect of
M&A direction is incorporated: the coefficient of
country law and regulation distance is significantly
negative (b1 = -0.019, p\0.05) although the coef-
ficient of country-risk distance is insignificant
(b2 = -0.002, p[0.1).
Most importantly, when the moderating effect of
M&A direction is incorporated, as shown in Model
2 of Table 3, the coefficients of the interaction
terms between country law and regulation distance
and Out, and between country-risk distance and
Out, are significantly positive (b8 = 0.041, p\0.05
and b9 = 0.020, p\0.1). Note that the marginal
interaction effects of law_reg_dis 9 out and coun-
try_risk_dis 9 out are not simply captured in b8 and
b9 (see Ai & Norton, 2003; Norton, Wang, & Ai,
2004). Following the formula in Ai and Norton
(2003) and Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004), we
derived the marginal interaction effect of law and
regulation distance and country-risk distance with
M&A direction based on the estimation of Model 2
in Table 3. Specifically, the marginal interaction
effects are 0.014 (p\0.01) for law_reg_dis 9 out and
0.007 (p\0.10) for country_risk_dis 9 out, respec-
tively, when using sample means of all other
variables. These results suggest that country dis-
tance (i.e., in law and regulation and in country
risk) decreases the chance for acquirers to conclude
an announced M&A, which is consistent with the
findings in prior research (Dikova et al., 2010)
based on a sample of cross-border M&As between
developed countries. However, such a negative
impact is stronger for inbound M&As than for
outbound. Thus we found empirical evidence sup-
porting H1(a) and H2(a), instead of H1(b) and H2(b).
Impact of Firm-Level Factors
Contrary to the negative impact of country-level
distance, we hypothesize in H3 and H4 that acquir-
ers’ experience has a generally positive impact on
deal completion but to different extents for
inbound and outbound M&As. However, as shown
in Model 1 of Table 3, while the coefficient of
acquirers’ past success experience in completing
past deals is significantly positive (b3 = 0.132,
p\0.01), surprisingly, the coefficient of acquirers’
past failure experience in completing past deals is
significantly negative (b4 = -0.185, p\0.01).
These results imply that while an acquirer’s past
success experience in completing M&A deals is
beneficial to the completion of subsequent deals,
past failure experience is detrimental to the com-
pletion of future M&As.
To see the moderating effect of M&A direction on
deal completion, as shown in the results of Model 2
in Table 3, we found that the coefficients of the
interaction term between acquirers’ past experience
and Out are significantly positive (b10 = 0.208,
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Inbound M&A (n = 2736) Outbound M&A (n = 747)
Mean SD Mean SD
Legal and regulatory distance 30.534 9.397 33.147 7.491
Country-risk distance 9.799 6.366 9.149 5.739
M&A success experience 0.694 1.526 0.388 0.862
M&A failure experience 0.310 0.785 0.166 0.557
Stake sought 62.968 35.720 75.032 34.265
Cash 0.127 0.333 0.214 0.410
Culture distance 15.176 6.250 14.741 5.162
Acquirer sizea 6.727 3.698 5.768 2.522
Geographic distance 8.667 0.695 8.787 0.662
Industry relatedness 0.512 0.499 0.551 0.497
Target status 0.183 0.387 0.216 0.412
Disclose 0.505 0.500 0.585 0.493
Attitude 0.895 0.306 0.931 0.252
Competing bidders 0.004 0.060 0.016 0.125
Note: aAcquirer size = log(total assets in million dollars). SD denotes standard deviation.
Failure of Cross-border M&As to vs. from Emerging Markets Chenxi Zhou et al
Journal of International Business Studies
p\0.01) for past success experience but significantly
negative for past failure experience (b11 = -0.183,
p\0.1). Similarly, we also derived the marginal
interaction effects of Exp_Suc 9 Out and Exp_Fail 9 -
Out using the sample means of all other variables,
which are 0.071 (p\0.01) for Exp_Suc 9 Out, but
-0.056 (p\0.1) for Exp_Fail 9 Out, respectively.
These results demonstrate empirical evidence sup-
porting our hypotheses H3(a) and H4(b), instead of
H3(b) and H4(a), implying that, while past success
experience is more beneficial for emerging-market
acquirers inoutboundM&As, past failure experiences
are more detrimental to these acquirers than to their
counterparts in inbound M&As.
Impact of Deal-Level Factors
Our estimation results also reveal interesting
impacts of deal-level factors. For example, our
results in Model 1 of Table 3 show that the impacts
of stake sought and cash payment are significantly
positive (b5 = 0.003, p\0.01, and b6 = 0.152,
p\0.05), without incorporating the moderating
effect of M&A direction. However, when distin-
guishing M&A direction, as shown in Model 2 of
Table 3, the coefficients of the interaction terms of
Stake_sought 9 Out and of Cash 9 Out are signifi-
cantly negative (b12 = -0.004, p\0.01 and
b13 = -0.336, p\0.05). Following Ai and Norton
(2003) and Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004), we also
derive the marginal interaction effects of Stake 9 -
Out and Cash 9 Out using the sample means of all
other variables, which are significantly negative,
-0.001 (p\0.01) for Stake 9 Out and -0.112
(p\0.05) for Cash 9 Out, respectively. To further
examine the net impacts of stake sought and cash
payment for inbound and outbound M&As, we
compute their marginal impacts when Out = 0 and
Out = 1, respectively. Most interestingly, we find
that the net impacts of stake sought and cash
payment are significantly positive (0.001, p\0.01;
and 0.068, p\0.01; respectively) for inbound
M&As (i.e., Out = 0), but negative (-0.0002,
p[0.1; and -0.034, p\0.1, respectively) for out-
bound M&As (i.e., Out = 1). These opposing results
imply that, although a larger percentage of stake
sought and full cash payments can help increase
the probability of completing inbound M&As,
doing so may decrease the probability of complet-
ing outbound M&As. Hence our empirical results
support H5(a) and H6(a) regarding the impact of
stake sought and cash payment for inbound M&As.
For outbound M&As, we found significant empir-
ical evidence supporting our hypothesis concern-
ing the impact of cash payment in H6(b) but not
regarding the impact of stake sought in H5(b).
Table 3 Impact of three-level factors on cross-border M&A
completion
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Legal and regulatory distance -0.012*
(0.008)
-0.019**
(0.009)
Country-risk distance 0.003
(0.008)
-0.002
(0.009)
M&A success experience 0.132***
(0.024)
0.115***
(0.025)
M&A failure experience -0.185***
(0.034)
-0.153***
(0.037)
Stake sought 0.003***
(0.001)
0.003**
(0.001)
Cash 0.152**
(0.076)
0.245***
(0.090)
Acquirer size 0.054***
(0.009)
0.048***
(0.009)
Legal and regulatory
distance*out
0.041**
(0.018)
Country risk distance*out 0.020*
(0.015)
M&A success experience*out 0.208***
(0.078)
M&A failure experience*out -0.183*
(0.120)
Stake sought*out -0.004***
(0.002)
Cash*out -0.336**
(0.153)
Size*out 0.062**
(0.028)
Out -1.788**
(0.800)
Culture distance 0.00
(.013)
0.008
(0.013)
Geographic distance 0.007
(0.083)
0.026
(0.084)
Industry relatedness -0.019
(0.050)
-0.015
(0.050)
Target status -0.128*
(0.078)
-0.137**
(0.077)
Disclose 0.356***
(0.054)
0.358***
(0.053)
Attitude 0.059
(0.082)
0.059
(0.082)
Competing bidders -0.806***
(0.288)
-0.748***
(0.292)
Fixed-year effect YES YES
Fixed-acquire nation effect YES YES
Fixed-target nation effect YES YES
Fixed-acquire industry effect YES YES
Fixed-target industry effect YES YES
Log-likelihood -1955.887 -1940.872
Pseudo R2 0.110 0.117
Sample size 3431 3431
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. When controlling for
the fixed-country effects, the final sample size becomes N = 3431
because some data are dropped due to lack of variation.
*** p\0.01, ** p\0.05, * p\0.1, one tail test.
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Robustness and Validity of Results
To examine the robustness and validity of our
results, we perform several additional analyses. We
first examine whether or not our results in Table 3
are robust when we use alternative measures of law
and regulation distance. In the international busi-
ness literature some studies have also used country
governance indicators, as developed by the World
Bank, to measure countries’ distance in law and
regulation (e.g., Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzil,
2003, Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). Following
these studies, we calculate the absolute difference
using the score of rule of law, a governance indica-
tor, between the home and host countries of a cross-
border M&A. We then re-estimate our Model 2
using this new measure of law and regulation
distance and present the estimation results inModel
B1 in Appendix B. As shown, our key results still
hold when this alternative measure is used.
Second, we also examine the robustness of our
results using an alternative measure of acquirer
experience in cross-border M&As. In Table 3, we use
a measure of acquirer country-specific success expe-
rience (i.e., the number of cross-border M&As com-
pleted in the same specific host country as the focal
M&Ain thepast) in theestimationofourModel 2.An
alternative measure of acquirer experience in cross-
border M&As is the acquirer’s global success (failure)
experience, which can be measured as the total
number of cross-border M&As that the acquirer has
completed (not completed) in the past, regardless of
whether the host country is same as the focal M&A
deal. Incorporating the success and failure experi-
ence at a global level, as presented in Appendix B
under Model B2, reveals that our key estimation
results still hold at a more significant level.
Third, we estimate our Model 2 using several
subsamples separately.6 Specifically, we estimate our
model by using five subsamples, respectively: (1)
inbound and outbound samples, as we previously
introduced; (2) China sample only; (3) India sample
only; (4) Brazil and India samples combined;7 and (5)
Brazil, India, and Russia samples combined. The
estimation results are reported in Appendix C. As
shown in the first and second columns of Appendix
C, our results in Table 3 still hold when we estimate
ourmodel using the inbound andoutbound samples
separately. As also shown in Appendix C, when we
use different country samples in the Model 2
estimation, results remain generally consistent,
although the significance level might vary (e.g., the
China sample has less significant results).
Finally, we test whether or not our estimation is
subject to sample selection bias. A potential
country-selection bias might exist because cross-
border M&As involve decisions based not only on
which target companies to acquire or merge, but
also on the choice of country expansion. To
address this issue, we applied the Heckman two-
stage estimation approach in our estimation of
Model 2 by controlling the country-selection
decision. Specifically, we estimate a country-selec-
tion equation in the first stage and then incorpo-
rate a correction term, derived based on the first-
stage estimation, in the second-stage estimation of
our Model 2 to correct for a potential country-
selection bias. To simplify the first-stage estima-
tion of the country-selection decision, we model a
dichotomous decision such that the country-se-
lection variable Y is defined as 1 if the announced
cross-border M&As were initiated from (1) devel-
oped countries and expanded to emerging mar-
kets, or (2) from developing countries and
expanded to developed markets. Otherwise, Y is
defined as zero.8 We then model this dichotomous
decision as a function of culture distance, geo-
graphic distance, country risk distance, rule and
regulation distance, firm- and deal-level variables,
and control variables. The Heckman two-stage
estimation demonstrates that the coefficient of
Mills’ ratio is not significant, suggesting that the
country-selection bias is not a severe issue in our
estimation (see results in Appendix D). More
importantly, as shown in Appendix D, we find
consistent results regarding the impacts of the
three-level factors and the moderating effects of
M&A direction on deal completion when the
country-selection decision is controlled.
CONCLUSION
With rapid economic development in recent dec-
ades, emerging markets have become not only
global centers attracting thousands of foreign-
direct investments via cross-border M&As, but also
global contenders with many of their companies
using M&As as a main globalization strategy for
aggressive expansion. Clearly, it is challenging for
both multinationals from developed countries to
expand into emerging markets and upstart compa-
nies from emerging markets to expand into global
markets. Processing cross-border M&As and manag-
ing post-M&A integration is also difficult. While
the extant literature has extensively studied the
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factors that impact post-M&A performance and has
focused mainly on cross-border M&As related to
developed markets, the impact of success in pro-
cessing a cross-border M&A and how global expan-
sion via cross-border M&As related to emerging
markets differ in direction (i.e., to vs. from emerging
markets) has been largely ignored. This article
examines an important period in the process of a
cross-border M&A, i.e., the public-takeover period
(i.e., from when an intended cross-border M&A is
announced to the completion of such an
announced M&A), and investigates (1) the influen-
tial factors affecting the completion of cross-border
M&As related to emerging markets; and (2) how the
impact of these factors differs in global expansion
via cross-border M&As to emerging markets (i.e.,
inbound M&As) and from emerging markets (i.e.,
outbound M&As).
Managerial Implications
Despite vast opportunities, engaging in and com-
pleting cross-border M&As related to emerging
markets is highly uncertain. Given the substantive
costs (i.e., monetary, reputational, and informa-
tion cost) from a cross-border M&A failure, it is
critical for global companies to understand how
they can enhance the chance of completion suc-
cess. To illustrate some specific managerial
insights, using the estimated Model 2 based on
our BRIC sample, we predict the completion prob-
ability of inbound and outbound M&As by varying
different values of country-, firm- and deal-level
factors. Specifically, given our Model 2 and the
estimated parameters in Table 3, we calculate the
predicted probability of deal completion for
inbound M&As (i.e., when Out = 0) and outbound
M&As (i.e., when Out = 1) by varying different
values of one factor at a time from seven influential
factors such as country law and regulation dis-
tance, country risk distance, acquirer size and
experience (i.e., both success and failure experi-
ence), stake sought, and cash payment, while
keeping all other variables at their mean levels.
Accordingly, we depict seven figures of these
predicted probabilities in Figure 3a–g. These fig-
ures clearly illustrate the differences in how coun-
try-, firm- and deal-level factors affect deal
completion of cross-border M&As to and from
emerging markets and provide specific managerial
insights discussed below.
First, as shown in Figure 3a–g, the predicted
probability of completing outbound M&As is, in
most cases, lower than that of inbound M&As,
which illustrates the liability of foreignness of
acquirers from emerging markets and disadvan-
tages that they are facing in completing oversea
M&As in developed economies. However, as coun-
try distance becomes larger, the advantages in
completing cross-country M&As by acquirers from
developed economies diminish (as shown in Fig-
ure 3a and b), reflecting the stronger negative
impact of country distance on deal completion for
inbound M&As. In particular, when the country’s
legal and regulatory distance is greater than 40, as
shown in Figure 3a, the predicted probability of
completing inbound M&As becomes lower than
completing outbound M&As. This finding implies
that, when engaging in cross-border M&As between
two countries with significantly larger distance in
their legal and regulatory environment, acquirers
from developed markets can have an even lower
success rate than their counterparts from emerging
markets in completing M&As. These predicted
probabilities of completing cross-border M&As
suggest that it may be safer for multinationals from
developed economies not to expand to countries
with significantly larger differences in their insti-
tutions or at the very least to pay extremely close
attention to the emerging markets’ investment
environment (i.e., the possibility of adverse
changes) during the public-takeover period.
On the contrary, Figure 3a and b also suggest that
the success rate is not necessarily lower even if
acquirers from emerging markets expand to a
developed country with greater differences in legal
and regulatory environments. While still impor-
tant, understanding country-level differences is less
of a problem for newcomers from emerging mar-
kets, since the relatively reliable and predictable fi-
nancial, legal, and economic systems in developed
nations makes it considerably easier for them to
learn and prepare during the very early stage of an
M&A. In other words, acquirers from emerging
markets should not be discouraged if they consider
expanding to a country with significantly greater
differences in their legal and regulatory
environment.
Second, to improve the success rate of complet-
ing a cross-border M&As in developed countries, it
is critical for acquirers from emerging markets to
expand and gain more experience in cross-border
M&As, as shown in Figure 3c and d. In particular,
when acquirers from emerging markets grow to be
about a size value of 15, which represents about
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Figure 3 Simulated impacts of three-level factors on cross-border M&A completion.
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$2,000 billion in total assets, or gain more than five
M&A success experiences in a specific country, they
can achieve the same level of success as multina-
tionals from developed economies in completing
cross-border M&As. These predicted probabilities in
Figure 3a–d suggest that the challenge to emerging-
market companies lies in whether or not (1) the
newcomers have capital assets and past M&A
success experience in selecting the right acquisition
target; (2) they can cobble together a network of
experienced investment banker and lawyers; and
(3) they can manage skeptical regulators, unions,
and stakeholders in the developed countries during
the deal-renegotiation stage.
Third, our results on the impact of past failure
experience raise caution to acquirers from both
developed and emerging countries. As shown in
Figure 3d and e, past success and failure experience
create opposite impacts on the completion proba-
bility; that is, although past success experience
creates benefits to both types of acquirer, past
failure experience can be detrimental. Furthermore,
Figure 3e also shows that the negative impact of a
past failure experience is stronger for acquirers from
emerging markets, indicating an even more detri-
mental influence on them from past failure expe-
rience. These figures not only further demonstrate
how hard it is for acquirers to learn from past
failure experience given the extremely high level of
complexity, unfamiliarity, and uncertainty
involved, but they also indicate that acquirers
may need to reevaluate and improve their internal
management and learning capabilities. To prevent
further failure, acquirers may need to consider
other relatively easier countries for cross-border
M&As. This is especially critical for emerging-
market acquirers, because an earlier success can
create tremendous learning benefits, whereas an
earlier failure can be destructive to future cross-
border M&As.
Finally, Figure 3f–g clearly demonstrate the dif-
ferences in the impact of deal-level factors on the
completion of the two types of cross-border M&A.
For example, Figure 3f and g show that owning a
larger percentage of stakes or paying 100% cash can
significantly improve the probability of completing
inbound M&As, but these actions can be harmful in
outbound M&As. For inbound M&As, a larger
percentage of stake sought can help increase the
completion rate because the emerging markets, as
the host countries in the inbound M&A deals, are
in greater need of capital investment. Thus a larger
commitment motivates the target company and
possibly the local government to facilitate the deal
completion. However, for outbound M&As, while a
higher stake sought and a full cash payment can
motivate the target company and the local govern-
ment to collaborate, they can create M&A risk and
host country’s antitrust and national security con-
cerns, which reduces the completion rate. There-
fore Figure 3f and g together imply that, while both
a larger stake sought and full cash payments are
effective in increasing the completing probability
for inbound M&As, they can be damaging for
outbound M&As.
Limitations and Further Research
This article is subject to several limitations that
provide opportunities for future research. First, as
an initial study in examining the completion
failure of global expansions, we focus on cross-
border M&As related to four fastest-growing
emerging markets, BRIC. It would also be inter-
esting to investigate the failure to complete cross-
border M&As from other emerging markets.
Second, due to lack of data availability, we focus
in our study on only public acquirers. Further
research can examine the generalizability of our
results by including both public and private
acquirers when more data on private firms become
available. Using such data, future studies might
also explore how the completion of global expan-
sion differs in acquirers’ public status as well as in
the M&A direction (i.e., to and from emerging
markets). Finally, it would also be interesting to
investigate how the failure to complete a cross-
border M&A impacts the acquirer. For example,
would the announcement of withdrawal from an
announced M&A impact the acquirers in a differ-
ent (asymmetric) way for outbound and inbound
M&As? Future studies could apply the event-study
methodology to examine the potentially asym-
metric impact of completion vs. withdrawal from
a cross-border M&A.
NOTES
1In hostile M&As, an acquirer might not go through
thorough negotiation with the target company in the
pre-completion stage, as the target management
refuses the acquirer’s M&A proposal. In these cases,
the acquirer may simply announce its intention to
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acquire a specific target company without reaching
any mutual agreement with the target before a public
announcement (Muehlfeld et al., 2012).
2http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-04-02/
world/35230664_1_foreign-direct-investment-fdi-
kaushik-basu.
3According to a recent new classification of emerging
and growth-leading economies by BBVA Research, we
include cross-border M&As to and from the following
ten countries as the total number of cross-border M&As
to and from emerging markets: BRIC, South Korea,
Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey, Egypt, and Taiwan.
4These 24 are classified as developed countries in
the following widely used country-classification
indices: The United Nation’s Human Development
Index (HDI), International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s list
of Advanced Economies, FTSE Group’s classification of
developed markets, and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA)’s list of developed countries.
5We also tested our hypotheses by excluding a small
sample of confounding takeovers in which (1) the
target company became the majority owner of the new
company after the merger and was classified as an
acquirer in the SDC dataset, and (2) SDC may
mistakenly treat the financing closing date as the deal
closing date. Our key findings still hold after the sample
of confounding cases was excluded. The estimation
results are available upon request from the authors.
6We also estimated an extended sample by includ-
ing not only the two types of cross-border M&As in
our main analysis (i.e., (1) from developed to emerg-
ing markets (D to E), and (2) from emerging to
developed markets (E to D)), but also two additional
types of M&As (i.e., (3) from developed to developed
markets (D to D), and (4) from emerging to emerging
markets (E to E). Our key findings still hold when using
this extended sample. The estimation results are
available upon request from the authors.
7There were only 33 and 83 outbound M&As in the
Brazil and Russia samples, respectively. These amounts
were too small to estimate Model 2 using each
separate sample from Brazil and Russia.
8We thank the anonymous reviewers for providing
us constructive suggestions as to how to test the
country selection bias by using a dichotomous coun-
try-selection model.
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APPENDIX A
Table A1 Industry distribution of cross-border M&As
Sample description Inbound M&A (n = 2736) Outbound M&A (n = 747)
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Acquirer industry
Agr. and cons. product 240 8.8 49 6.6
Manufacturing 1153 42.1 349 46.7
Utilities and transportation 261 9.5 39 5.2
Wholesale and retail trade 158 5.8 11 1.5
Financial services 430 15.7 50 6.7
Tourism and misc. service 494 18.0 249 33.3
Target industry
Agr. and cons. product 301 11.0 75 10.0
Manufacturing 1117 40.8 246 32.9
Utilities and transportation 274 10.0 49 6.6
Wholesale and retail trade 160 5.8 36 4.8
Financial services 294 10.7 82 10.9
Tourism and misc. service 590 21.6 259 34.7
Table A2 Developed country distribution of cross-border M&As
Inbound M&A (n = 2736) Outbound M&A (n = 747)
United States 801 29.3% United States 270 36.1%
Hong Kong 385 14.1% Hong Kong 90 12.0%
United Kingdom 212 7.7% United Kingdom 84 11.2%
France 178 6.5% Singapore 44 5.9%
Canada 171 6.3% Canada 43 5.8%
Japan 147 5.4% Australia 42 5.6%
Singapore 141 5.2% Germany 38 5.1%
Germany 100 3.7% Italy 20 2.7%
Australia 89 3.3% France 15 2.0%
Switzerland 83 3.0% Belgium 14 1.9%
Sweden 81 3.0% Netherlands 10 1.3%
Netherlands 80 2.9% Japan 9 1.2%
Spain 54 2.0% Finland 9 1.2%
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APPENDIX B
Table A2 continued
Inbound M&A (n = 2736) Outbound M&A (n = 747)
Finland 38 1.4% Spain 8 1.1%
Italy 35 1.3% Switzerland 8 1.1%
Belgium 27 1.0% Portugal 8 1.1%
Portugal 27 1.0% Luxembourg 8 1.1%
Norway 20 0.7% Denmark 7 0.9%
Luxembourg 19 0.7% Norway 5 0.7%
Austria 17 0.6% Austria 5 0.7%
Denmark 14 0.5% New Zealand 4 0.5%
New Zealand 6 0.2% Greece 3 0.4%
Iceland 6 0.2% Sweden 3 0.4%
Greece 5 0.2% Iceland 0 0.0%
Table B1 Robustness of results
Variables Model B1
(Alt. measure of
legal and
regulatory
distance)
Model B2
(Global
experience
used)
Legal and regulatory
distance
-0.236
(0.232)
-0.018**
(0.009)
Country-risk distance -0.005
(0.011)
-0.004
(0.009)
M&A success experience 0.112***
(0.025)
0.006**
(0.003)
M&A failure experience -0.130***
(0.037)
-0.031***
(0.012)
Stake sought 0.004***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
Cash 0.215**
(0.094)
0.244***
(0.089)
Acquirer size 0.051***
(0.010)
0.055***
(0.011)
Legal and regulatory
Distance*out
1.217***
(0.470)
0.044***
(0.018)
Country risk
distance*out
0.014
(0.016)
0.022*
(0.015)
M&A success
experience*out
0.180**
(0.080)
0.088***
(0.039)
M&A failure
experience*out
-0.212**
(0.120)
-0.192***
(0.054)
Stake sought*out -0.004**
(0.002)
-0.004**
(0.002)
Cash*out -0.268**
(0.159)
-0.348***
(0.152)
Size*out 0.063**
(0.029)
0.062**
(0.029)
Out -2.298***
(0.876)
-1.897***
(0.804)
Culture distance 0.016
(0.014)
0.010
(0.013)
Table B1 (Continued)
Variables Model B1
(Alt. measure of
legal and
regulatory
distance)
Model B2
(Global
experience
used)
Geographic distance 0.0005
(0.088)
-0.003
(0.084)
Industry relatedness 0.024
(0.054)
-0.025
(0.051)
Target status -0.110*
(0.084)
-0.112*
(0.078)
Disclose 0.357***
(0.056)
0.353***
(0.054)
Attitude 0.105
(0.089)
0.039
(0.082)
Competing bidders -0.788***
(0.294)
-0.753***
(0.298)
Fixed-year effect YES YES
Fixed-acquirer
nation effect
YES YES
Fixed-target
nation effect
YES YES
Fixed-acquirer
industry effect
YES YES
Fixed-target
industry effect
YES YES
Log-likelihood -1752.186 -1961.260
Pesudo R2 0.114 0.108
Sample size 3054 3431
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. We use the alternative
measure of legal and regulatory distance by calculating the absolute
difference of rule of law, a governance indicator, between the home and
host countries of a cross-border M&A. The sample size is smaller in
Model B1 due to missing data in the measure of legal and regulatory
distance in the year of 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001 that we derived
based on the country governance datasets provided by the World Bank.
*** p\0.01, **p\0.05, *p\0.1 (one tail test).
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APPENDIX C
Table C1 Estimation results using several subsamples
Variables By M&A direction By emerging countries
Inbound
M&As
Outbound
M&As
India only China only Brazil and
India
Brazil, India
and Russia
Legal and regulatory distance -0.016**
(0.009)
0.014
(0.021)
-0.016
(0.027)
0.0004
(0.018)
-0.023
(0.018)
-0.034***
(0.014)
Country-risk distance -0.004
(0.009)
0.030*
(0.022)
-0.034
(0.028)
-0.018
(0.020)
-0.009
(0.018)
0.006
(0.015)
M&A success experience 0.115***
(0.024)
0.370***
(0.075)
-0.005
(0.059)
0.204***
(0.044)
0.071**
(0.038)
0.067***
(0.025)
M&A failure experience -0.150***
(0.036)
-0.290***
(0.120)
-0.236***
(0.094)
-0.168***
(0.047)
-0.213***
(0.078)
-0.132**
(0.066)
Stake sought 0.003***
(0.001)
0.0003
(0.002)
0.005***
(0.002)
0.005***
(0.001)
0.003**
(0.0015)
0.003**
(0.001)
Cash 0.270***
(0.091)
-0.205*
(0.150)
0.347**
(0.187)
0.177*
(0.130)
0.422***
(0.149)
0.386***
(0.135)
Acquirer size 0.049***
(0.009)
0.086***
(0.029)
0.043**
(0.024)
0.052***
(0.012)
0.034**
(0.018)
0.038***
(0.015)
Legal and regulatory distance*out 0.014
(0.036)
0.051**
(0.027)
0.029
(0.032)
0.048**
(0.027)
Country risk distance*out 0.036*
(0.022)
-0.091*
(0.057)
0.025*
(0.019)
0.032**
(0.017)
M&A success experience*out 0.294***
(0.106)
0.130
(0.221)
0.226***
(0.094)
0.256***
(0.084)
M&A failure experience*out -0.068
(0.159)
-0.360*
(0.275)
-0.126
(0.157)
-0.180*
(0.139)
Stake sought*out -0.006**
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.003)
-0.004**
(0.003)
-0.003*
(0.002)
Cash*out -0.657***
(0.252)
-0.163
(0.281)
-0.605***
(0.222)
-0.528***
(0.201)
Size*out 0.101**
(0.045)
0.017
(0.047)
0.087**
(0.041)
0.081**
(0.037)
Out -1.487
(1.436)
-0.006
(1.195)
-1.945*
(1.302)
-2.646**
(1.165)
Culture distance 0.007
(0.014)
0.006
(0.031)
-1.082*
(0.791)
0.286
(0.231)
-0.057*
(0.035)
-0.025
(0.021)
Geographic distance 0.027
(0.088)
0.028
(0.270)
-1.493**
(0.856)
-0.017
(0.506)
-0.068
(0.187)
-0.054
(0.109)
Industry relatedness 0.005
(0.057)
-0.082
(0.121)
-0.103
(0.104)
0.075
(0.078)
-0.179**
(0.082)
-0.108*
(0.072)
Target status -0.171**
(0.087)
0.062
(0.177)
-0.099
(0.147)
-0.140
(0.148)
-0.102
(0.116)
-0.121
(0.101)
Disclose 0.323***
(0.060)
0.559***
(0.123)
0.420***
(0.105)
0.449***
(0.080)
0.304***
(0.085)
0.316***
(0.075)
Attitude 0.011
(0.090)
0.342*
(0.219)
0.340**
(0.166)
0.027
(0.121)
0.227**
(0.137)
0.108
(0.120)
Competing bidders -0.351
(0.417)
-1.230***
(0.424)
-0.691
(0.539)
-1.766***
(0.651)
-0.598*
(0.394)
-0.587**
(0.352)
Fixed-year effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed-acquire nation effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed-target nation effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed-acquirer industry effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed-target industry effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
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APPENDIX D
Table D1 Heckman two-stage estimation results
Variables First-stage
selection
model
N = 37806
Main
model
N = 3431
Legal and regulatory distance 0.071***
(0.022)
-0.027***
(0.010)
Country risk distance 0.133***
(0.019)
-0.009
(0.009)
M&A success experience -0.0023**
(0.0013)
0.122**
(0.024)
M&A failure experience 0.032***
(0.013)
-0.158**
(0.036)
Stake sought -0.0013**
(0.0008)
0.004***
(0.001)
Cash -0.423***
(0.095)
0.289***
(0.090)
Acquirer size -0.067***
(0.006)
0.054***
(0.009)
Legal and regulatory
distance*out
0.437***
(0.065)
0.053***
(0.019)
Country risk distance*out 0.053
(0.052)
0.028**
(0.016)
M&A success experience*out -0.060
(0.226)
0.213***
(0.081)
M&A failure experience*out 0.192
(0.513)
-0.150*
(0.110)
Sought*out -0.014**
(0.008)
-0.004**
(0.002)
Cash*out 3.065***
(0.733)
-0.405***
(0.154)
Size*out -0.308***
(0.077)
0.045*
(0.028)
Out 1.021
(1.431)
-2.255***
(0.828)
Culture distance 0.022
(0.021)
0.006
(0.013)
Table D1 (Continued)
Variables First-stage
selection
model
N = 37806
Main
model
N = 3431
Culture distance square -0.0013**
(0.0007)
Geographic distance 0.835***
(0.051)
-0.012
(0.087)
Geographic distance square -0.597***
(0.053)
Legal and regulatory distance
square
0.002***
(0.0004)
Country-risk distance square 0.003***
(0.001)
Industry relatedness 0.159***
(0.055)
0.006
(0.048)
Target status 0.994***
(0.069)
-0.112*
(0.080)
Disclose -0.125**
(0.059)
0.329***
(0.054)
Attitude 0.313***
(0.103)
0.005
(0.087)
Competing bidders -0.719***
(0.319)
-0.721***
(0.301)
Mills’ ratio -0.155
(0.122)
Fixed-year effect YES
Fixed acquire-nation effect YES
Fixed target-nation effect YES
Fixed acquire-industry effect YES
Fixed target-industry effect YES
Log-likelihood -3274.759
Note: ***p\ .001, **p\ .05, *p\ .10 (at one tailed test).
Table C1 (Continued)
Variables By M&A direction By emerging countries
Inbound
M&As
Outbound
M&As
India only China only Brazil and
India
Brazil, India
and Russia
Log-likelihood -1523.349 -401.665 -539.119 -873.995 -797.563 -1015.062
Pesudo R2 0.122 0.132 0.124 0.116 0.129 0.116
Sample size 2700 731 962 1438 1560 1969
Note: ***p\ .001, **p\0.05, *p\0.10 (at one tailed test).
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